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Abstract 
Purpose – The paper aims to explain how agency theory can be used to inform our 
understanding of the dynamics surrounding supply chain behaviours and relationships. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – A structured review of the literature using a three-stage 
refinement process is used. The articles were sourced through online databases and keyword 
classifications, such as “agency theory”, “principal-agent relationships” and “supply chain 
management”. The search initially identified over 86 articles. After further screening these 
were reduced to 19 for final assessment and comparison. 
 
Findings – Despite agency theory's prevailing descriptive and predictive qualities there is 
scarcity in its application to the SCM discipline. The authors posit that agency theory 
provides valuable insights for relationship engineering within supply chains where social, 
political, legal and behavioural dynamics dominate. 
 
Practical implications – It is a critical task for managers to understand and mitigate 
abnormal behaviours across the supply chain. Agency theory serves this need by providing 
them with a useful tool to respond to transaction cost dilemmas through contractual and non-
contractual remedies. 
 
Originality/value – This is one of the first studies that examines the current state of agency 
theory application in the SCM literature and suggests potential avenues for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last four decades, agency theory has been widely used across a variety of 
disciplines, but little work has been undertaken with regard to how agency theory might be 
used to explain relations between organisations within the supply chain (SC). Agency theory 
is relevant for the situations wherein one party (the principal) delegates authority – in terms 
of control and decision-making about certain tasks – to another party (the agent) (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Mitnick, 1973; Ross, 1973). Seminal contributions made by scholars such as Ross 
(1973, 1979), Mitnick (1973, 1975), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Eisenhardt (1989) have 
substantially improved our understanding about how agency theory informs economic 
relations (Stock, 1997). Other scholars have employed agency theory to explain relations in 
different disciplines such as economics and finance (e.g. Sappington, 1991), information 
systems (e.g. Mahaney and Lederer, 2003), and management (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; 
Eisenhardt, 1988). More recently, supply chain management (SCM) scholars have shown 
growing interest in using agency theory to understand how participants within the SC manage 
risks, align incentives and forge relationships (see, for example, Halldórsson and Skjott-
Larsen, 2006; Ritchie et al., 2008; Norrman, 2008; Shook et al., 2009). However, these 
works, which were largely inspired by Stock's (1997) suggestion on the application of agency 
theory in logistics, have only partially contributed to our understanding of SC relationships. 
A dearth of SCM studies employing agency theory runs counter to the prevailing value that 
its descriptive and predictive qualities appear to offer in terms of it representing “[…] a 
natural fit with supply chain management research” (Ketchen and Hult, 2007a, p. 576). To 
date there is no comprehensive review and examination concerning how agency theory has 
been used to explain relationship development within supply chains. This study aims to take a 
step forward in addressing this recognised gap in the SC literature by answering the following 
question: 
How can agency theory be used to inform our understanding of the dynamics surrounding supply chain 
behaviours and relationships? 
In order to answer this question a structured literature review has been completed by using 
online databases and keyword classifications, such as, agency theory, agency relationships, 
principal-agent relationships, incentive systems, supply chain management, and risk 
management. The search initially identified in excess of 86 articles that were published 
between 1973 (the start date is from Ross's and Mitnick's original contributions in 1973)[1] 
and 2011. After further analysis using keyword classifications (see section 4) the number of 
available articles relevant to this study was reduced to 19.  
The authors provide an explanation of agency theory, in terms of its branches and associated 
models and frameworks, in the next section. This is followed by a brief discussion on the 
methodology adopted for the study. Within the analysis section, SCM applications of agency 
theory have been explained and industry and methodology themes identified. How agency 
theory can be used to explore supply chain behaviour is reviewed within the discussion 
section. This is complemented by a brief explanation concerning the limitations of the theory. 
Included in the final section of the paper are concluding remarks, implications for 
management and opportunities for further research. 
 
2. Agency theory 
2.1 A dichotomous view 
From a management perspective, the evolution of agency theory can be dated to the 1960s 
and 1970s (Eisenhardt, 1989). Nevertheless, its origins can be found in the works on 
economic risk analysis where it began by addressing a common problem in organisations, 
individual-group goal incongruence and its impact on risk-sharing behaviour (e.g. Arrow, 
1985; Wilson, 1968, cited in Eisenhardt, 1989). This is reflected in the theory's recognition of 
the broader agency problems as entailing a portfolio of issues that need to be managed under 
conditions of uncertainty. Agency theory, in its modern form, largely originates from the 
work of Mitnick (1973) and Ross (1973), and embraces the areas of political science and 
economics, which broadens its application beyond simple contract relations. Following 
Mitnick's (1973) and Ross's (1973) lead, agency theory was subsequently adapted and used in 
a variety of other disciplines such as sociology (by Shapiro, 1987), management (by 
Eisenhardt, 1989) and in work involving the theory of the firm (by Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
In agency relationships, one party (the principal) delegates work to another party (the agent) 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1989). When the agent is acting for the 
principal it resembles behaviours such as performing for the benefit of the principal or acting 
as the principal's representative or employee (Mitnick, 1973). As Eisenhardt (1989, p. 58) 
points out, while the profit maximisation approach and self-interest persists, “[…] the focus 
of agency theory [centres] on determining the most efficient contract governing the principal-
agent relationship […]”. The notion of the contract is used here as a metaphor to describe the 
agency relationships (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and it is designed based on the outcome 
(e.g. commissions) or behaviour (e.g. salaries) of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). In agency 
relationships, typically, the principal will seek to minimise the agency costs, such as, 
specifying, rewarding and monitoring, and policing the agent's behaviour, while the agent 
works towards maximising rewards and reducing principal control (Fleisher, 1991). Efficient 
management of agency problems such as information acquisition (or communication), 
preference mismatch (or conflict of interest), effort (or moral hazard) and capability (or 
adverse selection), mainly associated with the agent (Fleisher, 1991), is also imperative to 
any principal-agent relationship. 
Developments in agency theory are largely based on two important streams of inquiry, 
namely, principal-agent research and positivist agency theory. The classical approach to 
understanding agency theory has historically followed the principal-agent relationships route, 
which assumes that the principal and agent will attempt to maximise their positions through 
individual interpretation of the contract, as highlighted earlier. The principal-agent research 
owes much of its development to the work of economists, who have used self-interest, 
bounded rationality and agent risk aversion as the principal determinants for mathematically 
modelling relationship building (Eisenhardt, 1989). This work has also been influential in 
development of the normative account of the agency theory (i.e. design of optimal contract-
based incentives to align principal and agent interests). The latter approach (i.e. positivist 
agency theory) has contributed to our understanding of real world behaviours in terms of 
agency logic (descriptive agency theory) (Mitnick, 2006). According to Mitnick (2006), both 
approaches are helpful in assisting researchers and managers to grasp the complexity of 
agency theory and its attributes. However, the mathematical and non-empirical orientation of 
the principal-agent research, along with its lack of real world application (Jensen, 1983), have 
been the primary causes of this stream of research stagnating academically, particularly in 
organisational research. 
Positivist agency theory (PAT) has largely evolved in order to overcome many of the 
shortcomings found in principal-agent research, in particular, the issue of complexity 
surrounding real world relationship dilemmas (Eisenhardt, 1989). PAT seeks to synthesise 
political science, expert agency, the law of agency and sociology into a single framework, 
which in turn attempts to explain how relationships in business and government develop, and 
offers suggestions as to how they might be managed more effectively (Shapiro, 2005). PAT 
also provides a useful framework for explaining how problems surrounding the issue of the 
separation of control (for example, agents acting independently) from ownership (the 
principal's desire to manage and maximise their resources, see Berle and Means, 1932) can be 
minimised (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Nilakant and Rao, 1994; Halldórsson and Skjott-Larsen, 
2006). PAT is thus useful for explaining non-rational behaviour of agents (and principals) 
when, for instance, an expert agent might be unwilling to share sensitive information with its 
principal because of lack of trust which underpins SC relationships. 
2.2 Hidden information/action model 
Two important challenges in agency relationships are misrepresentation of ability (adverse 
selection) and lack of effort (moral hazard), both of which are attributed to the agent. 
Focusing on these, hidden information and hidden action models, respectively, have been 
specifically developed to assist in designing an appropriate contract (Arrow, 1985; Bergen et 
al., 1992). These models work on the assumption that principals are aware of the nature of 
the task and the capabilities required (by the agent) to successfully accomplish that task 
(Bergen et al., 1992). Hidden information models focus on the problem of agent selection, 
specifically, the potential for falsification of skills and abilities of the agent (either at the time 
of hiring or during the activity). According to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), the main 
benefit of hidden information models is that they can assist in designing a contract which can 
be used to motivate the agent to take appropriate observable action, for example, a 
requirement for periodic reports on the condition of a rented asset to inform the owner about 
any faults. Furthermore, hidden information models focus on making agent capabilities 
explicit through the use of various management processes, such as, screening (e.g. personal 
interview), signalling (e.g. agents' signal on their capabilities) or providing opportunities for 
self-selection (e.g. training programmes for new recruits) (Bergen et al., 1992). 
In situations where an agent's action is difficult to observe (largely due to the complex nature 
of the task), the principal is exposed to a heightened risk of opportunism by its agent. In 
essence, there is an opportunity for the agent to both evade control and misrepresent its 
capabilities (Bergen et al., 1992). Hidden action models deal with the design of the contract, 
which can be used to mitigate the moral hazard problem and motivate the agent to take 
appropriate action (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). According to Bergen et al. (1992), 
principals are assumed to be risk-neutral whereas agents are typically risk-averse, which they 
believe is a mistake because of the fundamental differences in risk calculation strategies. The 
rationale underpinning this approach is that because principals have more power to diversify 
their investments, agents are highly dependent on the principal and are less likely to engage 
in inappropriate behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bergen et al., 1992). This assumes that 
capabilities and contractual power exist in a uniform manner across relationships, and that 
agent choice is limited. Evidence suggests, however, that agents are often prepared to accept 
greater risks, precisely because power and choice options do not exist as constants, and are 
often prone to dramatic change as industrial sectors and economies evolve (see, for example, 
Basov and Bardsley, 2005; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). These arguments serve to raise 
questions about the extent to which the principal-agent relationship might be conditioned by 
factors other than contractual obligations and limited capability risk assessments (Eisenhardt, 
1989). This becomes increasingly important when applied to supply chain operations, where 
factors relating to knowledge, commitment and trust often outweigh contractual relationships 
(O'Loughlin and Clements, 2007). 
3. SCM theory and practice 
Many SCM researchers have highlighted the need for greater practical application of 
organisational theories (see, for example, Shook et al., 2009; Stock, 1997; Ketchen and Hult, 
2007b; Halldórsson et al., 2007; Ketchen and Hult, 2007a), and in doing so have recognised 
organisational theory's pivotal role in explaining, describing, and predicting complex 
organisational behaviours (Flynn et al., 1990). These researchers have also been instrumental 
in identifying the significant bias towards transaction-cost economics (TCE) in the literature 
(Burgess et al., 2006). TCE argues that during any economic exchange, the cost of the 
product or service should also include all hidden costs (Williamson, 1981, 2002). For 
example, when establishing a relationship between a buyer and supplier, hidden costs might 
include time spent on developing the relationship, the drawing up of contracts by a lawyer, or 
travel between various locations. The explicit focus for TCE is the reduction of transaction 
exposure by accounting for all organisational costs (i.e. transaction and production costs) 
(Williamson, 2002). Alternatively, SC relationships are often intangible and TCE does not 
provide a sufficient explanation of social, political, legal and behavioural dynamics. TCE 
exclusively translates the many trade-offs within a make or buy decision into cost, which 
mainly implies tangibility. 
Consequently, a fundamental problem with TCE is that it makes assumptions about how 
relationships are structured and the ensuing forms of leverage that develop. It is the authors' 
contention that TCE overlooks two key considerations; the first involves contractual 
obligations and the way in which transaction costs are often dissipated throughout the SC. 
The second problem centres on the locus of control within SCs and, in particular, how often 
minor players are able to exert considerable leverage through structural manipulation. For 
example, it has been widely noted that within some of the “[…] best value supply chains 
[…]” issues such as time, quality, risk and flexibility can be easily manipulated by second tier 
agents (Ketchen and Hult, 2007a, p. 573). Arguably, shortcomings of TCE with respect to 
explaining SC relationship dynamics can be largely offset through the application of agency 
theory. Essentially, the authors posit that agency theory provides a mechanism that may be 
used to explain how players (both independently and as a collective) within the SC respond to 
transaction cost dilemmas where rational and non-rational behaviour occurs (Ketchen and 
Hult, 2007a). In addition, Stock (1997) posits that agency theory may also assist managers in 
understanding SC behaviour by focusing attention on the following issues: 
 the development of inter- and intra-organisational relationships; 
 the maintenance of complex relationships between suppliers and customers (e.g. 
vendors and third-party logistics providers); 
 the dynamics of risk sharing, capital outlay, power and conflict between channel 
intermediaries; and 
 identifying the costs and benefits of SC integration. 
In spite of its recognised explanatory power, within the SCM literature only a limited number 
of studies have used agency theory as their primary theoretical foundation, as listed in Table 
I. There have been arguments outside the SCM research that combined application of TCE 
and agency theory can be more promising (e.g. Williamson, 1988). Conversely, concerns 
have also been shown in treating them as complementary theories (e.g. Krafft et al., 2004). 
This debate while important is out of scope of this paper. Further deliberation on the 
significance of agency theory and how it can be used within SCM is presented in the analysis 
and discussion sections of this paper. Prior to that the methodology used for this paper is 
explained next. 
4. Research methodology 
4.1 Selection of articles 
The methodology used in this study is documentary research using electronic databases and 
data reduction procedures to collect information about a specific phenomenon (Platt, 1981), 
in this case, agency theory and its application to the SCM. Following similar review studies 
(see, for example, Burgess et al., 2006; Giunipero et al., 2008; Vanany et al., 2009), the 
authors have designed a structured process for selection of the appropriate literature. The 
strategy employed seeks to identify the relevant information through coded reviews and was 
undertaken as a separate process (to the references used throughout this paper) in order to 
identify the required articles. The literature survey has been undertaken using online 
databases, such as, Emerald, ScienceDirect, Inderscience and ABI/Inform Global Proquest. In 
this regard, a three-stage refinement process using data reduction procedures (e.g. keywords, 
title, abstract and conclusion) has been utilised. 
In the first stage codification of keywords and sentence strings, such as agency theory, 
agency relationships, principal-agent relationships, incentive systems, supply chain 
management, and risk management were used to facilitate the search. Results obtained 
through each database (using different combinations of the keywords) were then cross-
compared, compiled and checked for possible duplications. This yielded 86 articles published 
between 1973 and 2011. This stage was limited to refereed journal articles to ensure the 
quality of the documents and that they had gone through a strict review process. 
Title and keywords of the identified articles were screened in the second stage. If the authors 
were unsure about the suitability and relevance of particular articles they were included in the 
sample as a precautionary measure. A total of 54 articles (out of initial 86) were selected 
through this process. After a further round of coding 19 articles (out of 54) published between 
1996 and 2011 in various journals (see Figure 1) were identified. This third stage was 
accomplished after reviewing the abstract and conclusion of all 54 articles. 
To ensure that most of the specific SCM articles which employed agency theory were 
selected the authors also checked the full bibliography list of the final 19 papers. While no 
journal article was found to be missing from the results a few number of conference and 
working papers (see Appendix) were identified. These have been used in the general 
discussion part of the paper but not included in the main analysis, as the authors could not be 
certain of each paper's credentials and whether a peer review process had been undertaken. 
The inclusion criteria used in stage three centred on whether SCM (and related aspects such 
as procurement, manufacturing and logistics) and agency theory applications discussed 
within the abstract and/or conclusion of the respective article (for example, articles by Ritchie 
and Brindley, 2007; Narayanan and Raman, 2004, were discarded). Stages 1-3 were 
performed manually and a spreadsheet database was built with a search and check function to 
ensure criteria compliance was met. 
4.2 Review process 
To aid the content analysis, an instrument for collecting the main facts within each of the 19 
articles was also designed. These facts included, but were not limited to, author(s), area, 
industry, methodology, independent/dependent variables and objective (see Table I). This 
information was then used to identify the main themes for agency theory and SCM research, 
discuss the findings and finally draw the conclusions. 
5. Analysis 
5.1 SCM agency theory applications 
From the analysis conducted, a number of important research issues and themes were 
identified. Table I shows the content analysis framework that was also used to elicit relevant 
information from each of the 19 specific SCM papers. This section presents a cross-
comparison of this information across broader themes, such as, level and context of 
application and relationship factors (i.e. relations, information, risk and objectives). 
The analysis showed that agency theory has been used across various areas (e.g. procurement, 
manufacturing and logistics) relating to SCM. What is evident from Table I is that, positivist 
agency theory (PAT) plays a dominant role in SCM research. This is clearly an indicator of 
PAT's utility for SC investigations. Moreover, the identified pattern follows the idea which 
views PAT as being more accessible to organisational researchers mainly due to its non-
mathematical, real-world oriented nature (Jensen, 1983). Table I also shows that the majority 
of SCM studies using agency theory are concerned with general buyer-supplier (principal-
agent) relationships. This approach is in line with historical applications of agency theory 
within other disciplines, and can be broadly classified as intra- (e.g. employer-employee) and 
inter-organisational (e.g. supplier-retailer) categories. However, as supply chains often 
consist of multiple actors, by adopting a parsimonious approach to SC relationships, many 
researchers have tended to overlook some of the more important dynamics taking place 
within the SC. In order to counter this weakness, scholars have attempted to address it by 
discussing SC agency relationships in the form of triadic and tetradic relationships (see 
Agrell and Norrman, 2004; Agrell et al., 2004; Cheng and Kam, 2008; Hornibrook, 2007). 
These intricate network perspectives are instrumental in helping managers and researchers 
understand the realities of SC behaviour, as they illustrate just how complex SCs can be, 
particularly where there are multiple principals and agents (Wilding, 1998; Choi and Krause, 
2006; Surana et al., 2005). 
The SCM literature that does use agency theory has focused on Eisenhardt's (1989, p. 70) 
conceptualisation of “theory-relevant contexts”; specifically when: 
 there is substantial goal conflict between principals and agents (e.g. suppliers and 
buyers); 
 there is sufficient outcome uncertainty to trigger the risk (e.g. new product 
development); and 
 evaluation of behaviours is difficult (e.g. high-tech intensive agents) (see, for 
example, Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002; Morgan et al., 2007; Whipple and Roh, 
2010). 
Zsidisin and Ellram (2003) have pointed towards a greater tendency amongst purchasing 
organisations to mitigate risks by deliberately manipulating a supplier's behaviour to achieve 
greater compliance (e.g. supplier development, certification and co-developing of target 
costing), rather than managing agent activity through the implementation of buffers (e.g. 
safety stock and multiple sourcing). Zsidisin et al. (2004, p. 399) note that “[e]ach of the 
agency theory variables may have an influence on the extent to which purchasing 
organizations need to assess supply risk”. For example, Zsidisin and Smith (2005) show how 
in the aerospace industry, compliance strategies (such as early supplier involvement) have not 
only been used as a means of gathering information about behaviours of suppliers in order to 
mitigate risks and strengthen the principal and agent relationship, but also to lock suppliers 
into the SC. 
Norrman (2008) extended Zsidisin and Smith's (2005) work by examining how Agilent and 
Hewlett Packard have implemented supplier buffers, and concluded that agency relationships 
are likely to be more effective if both contractual and relational concerns are factored into 
relationship structures. Norrman (2008) further identified that problems associated with a 
shift in organisational culture are most likely to be the major barriers toward successful 
implementation of risk sharing contracts. Underpinning the cultural shift was also a problem 
of trust and how this either impinges on, or exacerbates, the risk-taking attitudes and 
activities of the agents. Norrman (2008) goes on to raise questions about whether contract 
incentivisation and reward strategies are sufficient to produce more compliant agent 
behaviour within the supply chain, and instil a greater sense of what is identified as purchased 
trust, where risk and reward appear to be equally balanced. Focusing on incentives and goals 
for mitigating the risk of agent opportunism, Hornibrook (2007) has suggested that there is a 
need to distinguish between short-term financial and long-term social incentives, as well as 
understanding how shared and independent goals might impact potential opportunism. 
Evidence suggests that both principals and agents might be inclined to moderate opportunistic 
behaviour where the trade-off between financial and social incentives is more clearly defined 
(O'Loughlin and Clements, 2007). 
Tiered SC networks are explored by Cheng and Kam (2008), who have proposed a 
conceptual framework for the analysis of risk in alternative network structures – ranging from 
the classical single agent and single principal through to the highly complex, tiered, multiple 
agent and multiple principal relationships. Cheng and Kam (2008) use agency theory to 
predict how participants respond to risks, which are outside of their control. They concluded 
that network collaboration is largely contingent upon the structure of the network, the 
functional role of each collaborator and, in particular, how principals and agents structure 
agreements, organise incentives, embrace trust and commitment, visualise short- and long-
term opportunities. Agency theory hence can offer the opportunity to understand the 
contextual factors and their implication for managing network collaboration (Danese, 2011). 
In addition, how supply performance is assessed needs to be taken into consideration, 
especially in tiered-multiple SC networks (see also Ritchie et al., 2008). 
Table II maps out the 19 papers used in the analysis along the both research themes discussed 
earlier (i.e. level/context of application and relationship factors). The numbers shown in 
Table II correspond to the numbers assigned to each paper within Table I. The four 
relationship factors have been extended in order to accommodate the eight relationship 
variables that are mostly discussed within the literature (see, for example, Clements and 
Wilson, 2009; Fawcett et al., 2008; Lambert et al., 1996; Min et al., 2005; Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2005). Partial and full gaps have also been shown using differen colours. 
It is important to note that relationship variables, such as, information sharing and incentive 
alignment, which are often considered as the foundations of the agency theory, have been 
extensively researched. Conflict resolution and goal congruence between SC participants 
have also been investigated with the aim of paving the way towards a more synchronised SC. 
Extending the conflict dynamic further, understanding how trust evolves in the SC has 
become a central focus for many researchers as it holds the key to how relationships are 
managed and maintained within the SC. 
While Table II provides a more comprehensive view of agency theory's current status within 
the discipline it also identifies gaps within the research. For example, as the level of 
application ascends (from dyadic to tetradic) the number of articles investigating the 
identified relationship variables descends. This indicates an obvious gap in the literature 
which might limit management's understanding of the challenges and choices within complex 
SCs where an actor's behaviour is prone to uncertainty. In addition, the authors analysis 
identified that little research has been undertaken involving agency theory and its 
implications for effective supply chain communications. 
5.2 Industries and methodologies used 
As mentioned in the research methodology section, 19 articles were reviewed which have 
been summarised using a number of categories, such as, industry, methods used, and purpose 
of theory. The findings show that in SCM, investigations have taken place across a wide 
range of industry sectors, from electronics, manufacturing, and telecommunication to high-
tech, aerospace, food, and groceries (see Table I). The broad spectrum of industry application 
highlights the utility of agency theory for use within different industrial settings. 
The majority of research that uses agency theory to explain relationships in the SC is 
empirical (approximately 73 per cent) (see Table I and Figure 2). The literature also 
highlights a number of important conceptual frameworks (see, for example, McMillan, 1990; 
Logan, 2000; McCue and Prier, 2008; Shook et al., 2009). The small number of SC papers 
that use agency theory to assist with modelling (see Figure 2) might be attributed to the fact 
that the discipline largely sees itself as practitioner driven, and that SCs have historically 
been conceived of as dynamic entities that cannot be easily modelled (Agrell and Norrman, 
2004). It is also important to note that the literature review revealed a gap in understanding of 
the relationship that exists between SC and agency theory. 
SCM has sought legitimacy through a variety of different disciplines, such as, third-party 
logistics as well as process-driven management methods and techniques, which are largely 
based on pragmatism (Golicic et al., 2005). Conversely, agency theory has adopted a more 
populist following, centring on organisational sensitivity and inductive reasoning (Heracleous 
and Lan, 2011). While not polar opposites, their differing epistemologies do present a 
challenge for researchers, who wish to explain relationship behaviour in supply chains. This 
does not invalidate their utility, far from it, but it does provide one possible explanation for 
the paucity of research. 
6. Discussion of the findings 
In addition to the findings obtained through the analysis, the extant body of knowledge 
around agency theory has been used to augment, support and critique (where deemed 
appropriate) the identified SCM agency theory applications. Analysis of SCM agency theory 
applications shows that agency theory provides a useful basis for understanding the diverse 
range of relationship activities within SCM (Agrell et al., 2004; Norrman, 2008; Agrell and 
Norrman, 2004). Based on the literature, mutual information, risk and reward sharing 
(Cooper et al., 1997; Lee and Whang, 2000), integrated relations and processes (Cooper et 
al., 1997; Bowersox and Closs, 1996; Clements and Wilson, 2009), goal congruence across 
the chain (La Londe and Masters, 1994), and establishment and maintenance of long-term 
business relationships (Cousins, 2002) are areas where agency theory has proved most useful. 
Therefore: 
P1. Agency theory can be used to inform contractual responses to outcome/behaviour 
uncertainty of agents (or principals) within the SC relationships. 
The authors' review of the specific SCM articles which used positivist agency theory (PAT) 
reveals its usefulness as a tool to understand, diagnose and mitigate abnormal behaviours 
within the SC relationships – from both a reactive and proactive perspective. This however 
should not be interpreted as trivializing principal-agent research and its application within the 
SC. Agency theory identifies behavioural change by SC actors and sheds light on activities 
involving principal and agent, self-interest, risk aversion, lack of trust, goal conflict and 
imperfect policy implementation (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). More importantly, it 
identifies how contractual responses might attenuate the tensions through, for example, 
information sharing, incentive alignment, and behaviour/outcome-based coordination 
(Knoppen and Christiaanse, 2007). Accordingly: 
P2. PAT provides a holistic view of the potential causes of (and remedies for) the abnormal 
behaviour of agents (or principals) within the SC relationships. 
The central tenets of agency theory have been used to partially show that where zones of 
tolerance (Wilson, 2006) and relationship elasticity (Zomorrodi and Fayezi, 2011) dominate 
supply chain relationship development, behavioural abnormalities are less likely to occur 
because the principal-agent relationship is more clearly defined. Why is this useful? In short, 
it is because agency theory is able to deal with some of the more complex elements of SC 
relationship intangibility, as well as co-exist with the more pragmatic approaches associated 
with complicated networks. Consequently: 
P3. PAT extends views centred on task and transaction by attending to specific attributes of 
agents (or principals) operating within the SC. 
The three propositions discussed above refer to the potential ways that agency theory may be 
employed to understand and control behaviour across SC relationships. From the analysis it 
was found that information sharing and incentivisation have received considerable attention 
in agency theory-based explanations of relationship/behaviour-contract alignment. More 
importantly, communication as an aspect of relationship development within the SC has 
received less attention by scholars. This is in contrast to the potential influence of inter-
organisational communication on the mitigation of behavioural uncertainty across the SC. It 
is therefore suggested that more work needs to be undertaken in this area to fully understand 
how agency theory might better explain SC relationships and behaviours. 
In light of the above discussion, in order for researchers to effectively employ agency theory 
in their SC investigations, some important points need to be further considered. First, many 
authors have reduced SC interactions to a simple dyadic relationship (e.g. Zsidisin and 
Ellram, 2003; Whipple and Roh, 2010). Part of the problem stems from the fact that some 
SCs are now so complicated that to be modelled efficiently requires many years' work; see 
the F-35's Global Supply Chain, which has over 1,300 suppliers from nine countries and 48 
US states. It is also regarded as the most expensive and complex project in US defence 
history (Levinson, 2011). Nevertheless, an argument that is also widely used in the literature 
is that whatever happens in single relationships needs only to be multiplied in order to 
understand the whole of the SC. As O'Loughlin and Clements (2007) have pointed out, this 
reduces SCs to a very simplistic level of sophistication. Furthermore, within the literature, 
researchers have tended to approach these relationships as being almost linear by design, and 
have promoted the principal's viewpoint as being that of the dominant partner (see, for 
example, McMillan, 1990; Lassar and Kerr, 1996; Zsidisin et al., 2004). Conversely, 
evidence suggests that in many SCs dominance depends on channel primacy, and not whether 
an organisation acts as principal or agent (O'Loughlin and Clements, 2007). 
6.1 What are the limitations for agency theory in SCM research? 
Whilst not invalidating the agency theory's value in terms of explaining SC relationship 
behaviour, the limitations of this theory need to be acknowledged. For example, an over-
emphasis towards economic drivers has become an important area of weakness in agency 
theory use (Heracleous and Lan, 2011). This is in part an historical legacy, and also occurs 
because many SCs have traditionally been conceptualised as economic exchange 
mechanisms, rather than being comprised of complex social and economic relationships 
(Bergen et al., 1992; Hirsch et al., 1987). Further within SCM research, the so-called 
“economist blinders” (Shapiro, 2005, p. 268) act to limit the explanatory power of agency 
theory by directly obscuring it from an organisation's behaviour, which is both complex and 
not easily reduced to numbers. 
Agency theory's view of the flawless principal and imperfect agent relationship is also 
questionable. As Perrow (1986) has commented, agency problems (i.e. adverse selection, 
moral hazard) are not restricted solely to the agency side of the relationship, but also exist on 
the principal side. This becomes vital within the context of SCM as the inter-dependency that 
makes up the SC means that principals and agents often swap roles. Figure 3 illustrates how 
the dynamic principal-agent relationship might function in a traditional SC, for instance, a 
particular distributor who is acting as the principal of a manufacturer (agent) while at the 
same time playing the role of agent for the wholesaler (principal). The link between 
principals and agents is through information and material flow pipelines, which are in turn 
moderated by contract mechanisms. 
Increased complexity (i.e. extended networks of principals and agents) is another issue which 
is not articulated well within classical agency theory. The “hydra factor”, as Adams (1996, p. 
16) had termed it, is a feature of the multiple agency relationship and has come to dominate 
many SCM environments. In short, the existence of multiple principals and agents makes 
information balancing and the monitoring of behaviour more challenging. Particularly, when 
agents have competing interests over the delegated task, and the portfolio of heterogeneous 
agents makes the governance of these dynamic relationships more complex and problematic 
(Cheng and Kam, 2008). At best, the supply chain literature points toward incorporating 
partner-specific characteristics in tailoring supply chain initiatives with an agent or a cluster 
of – more homogeneous – agents (see, for example, Zu and Kaynak, 2012 in the context of 
supply chain quality management). 
The measurement tools employed by agency theory also need to be considered. Evidence 
from the literature suggests that measurement design problems are mainly a result of the lack 
of rigorous testing, as opposed to the limitations of agency theory itself. This was highlighted 
by Bergen et al. (1992) who suggested that researchers must pay more attention to the 
dynamic nature of the relationships and questions, such as, how agency problem mitigation, 
through incentive mechanisms, might alter along the tenure of principal-agent relationships. 
This is important because, for example, growing concerns with environmental uncertainty, as 
an agency variable, should not only be seen as an objective measure (e.g. a purely financial 
measure) but also through subjective dimensions (i.e. as perceived uncertainty by the agent(s) 
and principals) (Bergen et al., 1992). This is becoming very important where principal-agent 
SC relationships are increasingly being influenced by third party regulation. For example, the 
growing acceptance and inevitability of carbon tax measures and policies mean that both the 
principal and agent have to engage in even more complex negotiations in order to maintain a 
consistent working relationship (Mason-Jones and Towill, 1998; Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2011; Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011; Sanchez-Rodrigues et al., 
2008). 
In spite of these limitations, it is important to note that agency theory's explanatory power, 
especially with regard to relationship dynamics, still provides robust basis for understanding 
the behaviour surrounding contractual relationships, whether implied or legal and rational or 
irrational, that are found within the SC. However, some of the deficiencies of the theory 
might be mitigated by integrating other relational theories such as TCE (Williamson, 1981), 
game theory (Nagarajan and Sosic, 2008), resource-dependence (Pfeffer and Alison, 1987) 
and relational exchange (Heide and John, 1992). 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to highlight the status of the application of agency theory and to 
address the question of how can agency theory be used to inform our understanding of the 
dynamics surrounding supply chain behaviours and relationships? Documentary research was 
undertaken to extract the level of current understanding around the topic. In doing so, the 
analysis was performed using electronic databases and a three-stage refinement process 
which resulted in identification of 19 papers that have employed agency theory for explaining 
SCM issues. It was observed that within the SCM domain, the researchers have used a variety 
of industry settings. Managerial implications and avenues for future research are discussed in 
the next sections. 
7.1 Implications for management 
Multi-disciplinary analysis of agency theory studies has shown that the managerial 
implications of this theory can range from relationship establishment and development to 
relationship maintenance and even termination within the SC environments. This could entail 
both downstream and upstream processes as well as the internal operations of the primary 
supply chain partners. In holistic terms, agency theory is a useful tool for managers to 
diagnose and segregate their portfolio of relationships. Regardless of the fact that the 
organisation has a transactional or partnership relationship with its partners, it is a critical 
task for managers to understand and mitigate behavioural uncertainty across the SC. Several 
anecdotal cases can be identified in the literature where the sources of operational problems 
have been related to ineffective management of inter-organisational relationships, and/or 
where the distrustful atmosphere has triggered the opportunistic behaviour of the partners 
(Cousins, 2002; Ritchie et al., 2008; Richey et al., 2010). 
In essence, agency theory can explain how players (both independently and as a collective) 
within the SC respond to transaction cost dilemmas where rational and non-rational 
behaviour occurs (Ketchen and Hult, 2007a). Hence, abnormal behaviours of network 
partners can be analysed and, subsequently, counterbalancing remedies can be devised. This 
process, in turn, might contribute to the development and maintenance of a trusting 
atmosphere in business relationships. Moreover, it is invaluable in either increasing or 
decreasing the tolerance threshold of managers (with respect to re-engineering their 
supplier/customer relationships) who are constantly dealing with complex organisational 
behaviours within their SC. 
As noted above the implications are applicable to various outbound and inbound processes 
and practices such as vendor-managed inventory (VMI), just-in-time (JIT), collaborative 
planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR), enterprise resource planning (ERP) and 
efficient consumer response (ECR). All these practices are relationship-intensive and their 
implementation requires a high level of task or authority delegation across principals and 
agents participating in a SC. The successful implementation of SC processes and activities 
could be provisioned by catering for agent-specific conditions through dynamic contractual 
relationship. Agency theory may help managers to factor social, economic, political and 
behavioural aspects into their contract decision-making, by undertaking adaptive measures 
around incentivisation, information sharing and goal congruence. Researchers could also use 
agency theory to assess the implementation, success or failure of the above-mentioned 
practices from the SC relationships perspective. 
7.2 Suggestions for future research 
The authors posited that agency theory is suitable for studying SCM. Conversely, it was 
found that the extant literature is subject to many gaps and this highlights the need for further 
research. Future studies should explicitly recognise the application of agency theory for 
studying issues such as information sharing, risk/reward sharing, and 
establishment/maintenance of inter-organisational relationship at the SC level of analysis (as 
opposed to the prevailing dyadic investigations in the literature). Further attention also needs 
to be paid to the assumptions underlying agency relationships within SC environments. This 
is significant as supply chains that span country borders and even continents, might be 
affected by cultural variation (Brown Johnson and Droege, 2004). The theoretical lens that 
agency theory provides can support managerial decision-making and strategy formulation, 
specifically with respect to supplier and customer relationships. Supply chain 
communications is another area where agency theory might help to explain the influence of 
effective inter-organisational communication on the mitigation of behavioural uncertainty 
across principals and agents transactions. 
The authors also recommend application of agency theory in the study of collaboration and 
uncertainty/change across the SC (see, for example, Plambeck and Gibson, 2010). 
Collaboration can be seen as relational integration between multiple principals and agents 
based on the efforts in information exchange, goal congruence, and incentive alignment 
which have the potential to induce trust and reduce uncertainty for the effective management 
of supply chains. Future research can investigate how agency variables such as goal conflict, 
information asymmetry, and risk aversion can be altered to achieve positive outcomes 
through effective collaboration. This research also has implications for the uncertainty 
mitigation between principals and agents that might ultimately result in reduced uncertainty 
along the SC. Conceptual in nature but drawing on both theoretical and empirical agency 
theory studies, this paper discussed a tool for managing complex SC behaviours and 
relationships. As noted previously, integrating agency theory with other organisational 
theories, such as, TCE and relational exchange offers promise in potentially offsetting its 
limitations. Perhaps, as the complexity of SC relationships necessitates, case study 
investigation in industry-specific supply chains can augment the conceptual discussion of this 
paper. 
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Notes 
1. It is important to note that agency theory has a long and varied history (from property-
rights theories, through organisation economics, contract law and political philosophy, 
and has been associated historically with the work of Locke and Hobbes), but official 
recognition of agency theory as a formal theory has been dated to the early 1970s, and 
the work of Ross (1973) and Mitnick (1973). 
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